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The advent of the digital era provided a fertile ground for the development of virtual societies,
complex systems influencing real-world dynamics. Understanding online human behavior and its
relevance beyond the digital boundaries is still an open challenge. Here we show that online social
interactions during a massive voting event can be used to build an accurate map of real-world
political parties and electoral ranks. We provide evidence that information flow and collective
attention are often driven by a special class of highly influential users, that we name “augmented
humans”, who exploit thousands of automated agents, also known as bots, for enhancing their
online influence. We show that augmented humans generate deep information cascades, to the same
extent of news media and other broadcasters, while they uniformly infiltrate across the full range
of identified groups. Digital augmentation represents the cyber-physical counterpart of the human
desire to acquire power within social systems.
INTRODUCTION
Online social actions drive collective attention and dy-
namics [1, 2], having a deep impact on the construction
and perception of social reality. Many large-scale stud-
ies have reported evidence of online ecosystems alter-
ing decision-making of crowds [3] and influencing real-
world voting of millions of people [4]. The last few
years have seen a deluge of increasingly more sophisti-
cated automated online agents, called also “bots”, pop-
ulating techno-social systems cleverly disguised as hu-
man users [5–9]. Nowadays, bots can produce credi-
ble content with human-like temporal patterns [10–12].
By promoting online activity, bots can interact with hu-
mans and influence their standing against specific top-
ics such as political issues [7, 10, 12, 13]. Since ma-
noeuvring social platforms can deeply affect real-world
dynamics [14, 15], understanding if and how computer-
generated activities can alter the behavioral responses of
humans to achieve online social manipulation is of ut-
most importance [5, 16, 17]. Identifying and quantifying
these effects is particularly crucial during voting events,
where individuals’ decisions might be driven by external
events, such as natural disasters or economic shocks [18].
While attention is generally paid to how physical interac-
tions among voters and electoral arrangements influence
voting behavior, Bruter and Harrison [19] shifted the fo-
cus on the psychological influence that electoral arrange-
ments exert on voters by altering human emotions and
behavior. The investigation of voting from a cognitive
perspective leads to the concept of electoral ergonomics:
Understanding the optimal ways in which voters emo-
tionally cope with voting outcomes can lead to a better
prediction of the elections.
Here we quantify to which extent online social activity
reflects the real world and we characterize the peculiar
behavior of a class of individuals who make a massive
use of bots to enhance their online visibility and influ-
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ence. The term cyborg has been used in this context
to identify, indistinctly, bot-assisted human or human-
assisted bot accounts generating spam content over so-
cial platforms such as Twitter [5, 20]. Here, we prefer to
use the term augmented human for indicating specifically
those human accounts exploiting bots for artificially in-
creasing, i.e. augmenting, their influence in the digital
world, analogously to physical augmentation improving
human performances in the real world [21]. Like several
automated agents identified in our data set, augmented
humans played a special role for information spreading,
by triggering deep information cascades with the help of
bots.
RESULTS
We collected 966,483 messages posted to the mi-
croblogging platform Twitter from 194,273 unique users
during Italian elections (see Methods for details). The
data was collected from February 24 2018 until March 5
2018.
Bot identification
To identify automated agents in the data set, we devel-
oped a deep neural network model (see Methods and SI),
which classified 13.4% of users as bots, a value compati-
ble to estimations during other voting events [10–12]. We
built the network of interactions between human users
and bots, including different types of social actions such
as Retweets (i.e. a user sharing another user’s message),
Mentions (i.e. a user mentioning another use in a mes-
sage) and Replies (i.e. a user starting a discussion with
another user). While Mentions and Replies can have
both negative and positive connotations, Retweets are
traditionally considered as a form of social endorsement
[17, 22]: Users tend to retweet and thus endorse content
they agree with.
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2Human-bot interactions: Homophily and centrality
Figure 1 shows the temporal evolution of volumes for
messages (i.e., Tweets) and the considered social actions
for both bots and humans. Figure 1 (a-d) indicates the
overall fraction of messages exchanged between bots and
humans (a), and the fractions stratified by social interac-
tions (b-d). Most of the social interactions are from hu-
mans to bots (46%); Humans tend to interact with bots
in 56% of mentions, 41% of replies and 43% of retweets.
Bots interact with humans roughly in 4% of the inter-
actions, independently on interaction type. This indi-
cates that bots play a passive role in the network but are
rather highly targeted by humans. Figure 1 (e) shows the
number of social interactions over time. The circadian
rhythm is evident, i.e. at night the volume of messages
generated by humans drops down. Also bots display a
similar circadian rhythm, in agreement with previous ob-
servations [10, 12]. In general, bots contribute to 6% of
the total number of social interactions occurred during
the voting event (March 4 2018). Figure 1 (f) reports the
geographic locations of both human and bot users in the
social system. Although most of the users are located in
Italy, there are significant fractions of human users also
located in the United States and in Europe, indicating
the worldwide relevance of the Italian voting. Similarly,
bots’ locations are distributed worldwide and they are
present in areas where no human users are geo-localized
such as Morocco, Peru, Finland or Indonesia.
The analysis of observed social interactions (links) be-
tween users (nodes) before, during and after the voting
day revealed bot homophily, i.e., automated agents tend
to interact more with other bots rather than with hu-
mans compared to random expectation (see SI). Since
interactions encode content spread [16], this result indi-
cates that bots share messages mainly with each other
and hence can resonate with the same content, be it
news or spam. Furthermore, if we quantify the cen-
trality of a user in terms of the probability of finding
it by exploring the web of interactions at random, then
we find that bots are almost twice as central as humans
(see SI). The above findings indicate that bots play the
role of sinks for information flow. In fact, 9 out of 10
hubs – i.e., highly interacting users – are bots and they
are mainly news media and public profiles of politicians,
which usually act as broadcasters and drive online in-
formation flow [15, 17]. The analysis of topic frequency
and associations in bot-generated messages confirms this
trend: Bots act as broadcasters by repeating the same
political content of human users, boosting the spread of
hashtags related to the electoral process (see SI).
Information cascades identify different classes of
influencers
The observed social interactions build a complex net-
work with a heterogeneous connectivity distribution.
Such systems are well known for being susceptible to
cascading events [23, 24] and, in the case of online so-
cial networks, the phenomenon might manifest as col-
lective action and faster diffusion of specific information
[1, 2, 25, 26]. In information cascades, a single piece of
information is originated by a seed user, it is endorsed
by other users in his/her neighborhood and consequently
re-shared across the network [25]. Cascade size depends
on a variety of factors [27], including – but not limited
– to the structure of the network and the information
content, making their prediction rather difficult [26].
We have tracked 83,593 information cascades during
Italian elections and, for each one, we have analyzed the
underlying structure by measuring its size, i.e. the num-
ber of times an information has been re-shared, and its
diameter, i.e. the maximum topological distance, not ac-
counting for the directionality of the dynamical process.
As expected for complex networks with highly heteroge-
neous connectivity [23], the distribution of observed cas-
cade sizes is heavy-tailed and compatible with a power
law characterized by a scaling exponent γ = −2.33±0.04,
similarly to size distribution in percolation theory or
avalanches in self-organized criticality [28]. Cascade size
ranges between 2 and 4,313.
We show in Fig. 2 (a) a heat map of cascade size vs. the
size of initiators’ social neighborhood (i.e., the number of
followers). As expected, on average, larger the number
of followers larger the cascade size, with very few excep-
tions. Figure 2 (b) shows the same data, with explicit in-
formation about user classification and the cascade diam-
eter, ranging between 2 and 6. This figure shows a good
separation between human and bot behavior. Deeper in-
formation cascades are generated mostly by humans with
a high number of followers, with the remarkable example
of one, User01, who produced the largest cascade among
humans and bots despite having less than 100 followers.
Recently, dynamical activity-connectivity maps based
on network and temporal activity patterns – or their vari-
ation – have been used to identify influential individuals
or broadcasters during online protest diffusion [15] and
contagion dynamics of extremist propaganda [29]. For
instance, Bastos and Mercea [30] used hashtag trends
for showing the existence of “serial activists”, users with
ordinary numbers of followers but very prolific in produc-
ing content about multiple political topics and bridging
together disparate communities. Gonzalez et al. [15] re-
lated topological properties, such as the ratio between
incoming (friends) and outgoing (followers) connections,
to dynamical properties, such as the ratio of received and
posted messages.
Here, we argue that it is also plausible to relate individ-
uals’ social influence to the size of information cascades
they generates with their content [31]. To this aim, we
propose a more complex map relating a topological fea-
ture, i.e. the number of outgoing connections (followers),
and a dynamical feature, i.e. information cascade growth
rate, defined by the ratio between a cascade size and its
duration over time. Baseline social behavior during a
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FIG. 1. Online human-bot interactions during the Italian elections. (a): Volumes of human-bot interactions in
Twitter. (b-d): Human-bot interactions stratified by actions: Mentions, Replies and Retweets. (e): Evolution across time of
the overall social activity of humans and bots (top), also stratified by actions (bottom). (f): Geographic location of involved
users, where the color encodes the number of tweets per country, in logarithmic scale. As in (a), humans are in red and bots
are in blue. Users are mostly located in Italy, with relevant interactions from other countries worldwide.
specific event, such as the Italian election in our case, is
defined by the medians of the two observables, like shown
in Fig. 2 (c). This map allows to easily identify four
categories of individuals in the social dynamics: i) hid-
den influentials, generating information cascades rapidly
spreading from a small number of followers; ii) influen-
tials, generating information cascades rapidly spreading
from a large number of followers; iii) broadcasters, gener-
ating information cascades slowly spreading from a large
number of followers; iv) common users, generating infor-
mation cascades slowly spreading from a small number
of followers. Remarkably, the topological and dynamical
behavior of humans and bots is very different: during
Italian elections, bots are mostly broadcasters (mostly
media) and influentials (mostly political leaders). Figure
2 (c) (left) highlights a positive correlation between cas-
cade rate and size: Cascades involving more users tend
also to flow over the interactions web at faster rates. This
positive trend is stronger for cascades of sizes larger than
102. The stronger correlation for larger cascades sug-
gests that they differ qualitatively from smaller cascades:
Larger cascades contain specific semantic content, in this
case political-related topics, which accelerate spreading.
The social bulk of endorsements mirrors political
antagonism
So far, our analysis characterized online human behav-
ior in terms of human-bot interactions and information
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FIG. 2. Information cascades during Italian elections. a) Heatmap of the number of users initiating information cascades,
as a function of the size of their social neighborhood (Followers) and the size of the generated cascade; b) Scatter plot of the
same data, with points encoding users. Color encodes bot/human classification and size encodes cascade’s diameter; c) As
in a) but considering cascade rate, defined by the ration between cascade size and its duration, vs. neighborhood size (left
panels) and cascade size (right panels), for humans (top panels) and bots (bottom panels). The heatmap of cascade rate vs.
neighborhood size allows one to identify 4 categories: hidden influentials, influentials, common users and broadcasters (see the
text for further detail). Dashed lines indicate medians of structural and dynamical features in humans. Only cascades with at
least 10 adopters are considered and, for heatmaps, the logarithm of the corresponding variables is considered.
spreading. However, to quantify to which extent the ob-
served online social activity reflects the real world a more
sophisticated analysis is required. To this aim, we ana-
lyzed the static representation of the system, where in-
teractions across time have been aggregated to a directed
and weighted social network. We then identified the core
of the observed social system by tracking the most rele-
vant interactions among the most important actors. We
identified relevant interactions by assuming that if two
users share similar political ideologies, they can endorse
and subsequently share (i.e. retweet) the content of each
other. However, if only re-sharing was considered, the
network would contain a lot of spurious connections due,
for instance, to fortuitous endorsement rather than to a
systematic intention.
We first filtered the network by considering only pair of
users with at least one retweet, with either direction, be-
cause re-sharing content it is often a good proxy of social
endorsement [22]. We then considered a more selective
restriction, by requiring that at least another social ac-
tion – i.e., either mention or reply – must be present in
addition to a retweet. This restrictive selection allows one
to filter out all spurious interactions among users with the
advantage of not requiring any threshold with respect to
the frequency of interactions themselves. The resulting
network is what we call the social bulk, i.e. a network core
of endorsement and exchange among users. By construc-
tion, information flows among users who share strong
social relationships and are characterized by similar ide-
ologies: In fact, when a retweet goes from one user to
5another one, both of them are endorsing the same con-
tent, thus making non-directionality a viable approach
for representing the endorsement related to content shar-
ing. Therefore, in the following, we can safely consider
undirected interactions among users. Connections be-
tween users are weighted by the aggregated frequency of
their social interactions. An illustration of how the social
bulk is built is shown in Fig. 4 (a).
In the following, we introduce different measures to
quantify different features of the social bulk, i.e. social
polarization, fragmentation and segregation.
The concept of social polarization assumes the exis-
tence of two competing stances or opposing groups char-
acterizing the mesoscale organization of the system [32].
In presence of two groups, they can be identified by cal-
culating, for instance, the Fiedler partitioning [12, 33],
which is related to the min-max cut problem for finding
optimal flows in networks [33]. Fiedler partitioning (see
Methods) separates the users of a connected graph into
two classes such that the total number of inter-class con-
nections is close to the optimal minimum. If interactions
encode strong social relationships, as in the social bulk,
then the Fiedler partitioning identifies two factions an-
tagonizing each other by sharing the least endorsements
possible.
We measure social polarization by computing the mod-
ularity [34] of the social bulk with respect to its Fiedler
partitioning (see Methods). The larger the modular-
ity Φ of the Fiedler partitioning, i.e. system polariza-
tion, the more antagonized are users into two opposing
groups. For the largest connected component of the so-
cial bulk we calculate the polarization ΦF = 0.452. The
expected polarization of a null model – where social rela-
tionships are uniformly randomized while preserving the
individual degrees and the distribution of strengths –
is
〈
ΦrandF
〉
= 0.301, significantly different from the ob-
served network (p-value < 10−5). This result indicates
that the heterogeneity of social interactions can not ex-
plain, alone, the observed level of polarization, which has
rather to be attributed to other causes such as political
parties or opposing political trends.
However, during the Italian elections considered in this
work more than two political parties were present, so that
the notion of polarization has to be extended to account
for the presence of several opposing groups. For complex
networks, a widely adopted approach is to use modular-
ity maximization for group identification [34–37]. Iden-
tified communities of users are characterized by intra-
group connectivity denser than inter-group one.
In the case of the social bulk we can interpret mod-
ularity as an estimation of system’s social fragmenta-
tion into more than two opposing groups. Here, we use
the Louvain multilevel approach, known to be very ef-
ficient on large-scale networks [38]. In the whole social
bulk we measure a fragmentation ΦL = 0.812, indicat-
ing the presence of several factions in the bulk network
that are in a stronger opposition when compared to the
null model (
〈
ΦrandL
〉
= 0.692, p-value < 10−5). The fact
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FIG. 3. The online system is characterized by social
fragmentation. Top: Fragmentation encodes the tendency
of online users to organize in multiple opposing groups (see
the text for further detail). During the four considered peri-
ods, the online social network is fragmented much more than
random expectation. Small changes in fragmentation of the
observed system across time are reflected in the null model,
indicating that they can be explained by small changes in the
heterogeneity of the underlying connectivity.
that ΦL > ΦF indicates that a more accurate description
of the mesoscale organization of the social bulk is given
when more than two groups are considered, in agreement
with our hypothesis that results should reflect the real
world socio-political scenario. To understand if this find-
ing is robust or just an artefact due to how the social
bulk is built, we have measured the social fragmentation
of the original system during all phases of voting (see
Fig. 3). Once again, we observe that social fragmentation
is stable across time and significantly larger than random
expectation, confirming that results obtained from the
social bulk are consistent.
However, neither polarization nor fragmentation can
be used to quantify to which extent the system consists
of isolated groups – the ones with no interactions with the
rest of the system – which are effectively segregated in the
network. Note that we are not referring to users in the
periphery [39, 40] of the system, where information can
slowly but flawlessly flow among all nodes in the network.
Instead, we refer to groups unable to exchange informa-
tion with the core of the system, i.e., to nodes belonging
to disconnected components. We quantify social segrega-
tion Σ by considering the average number of connected
components weighted by the number of their links (see
Methods). If a social network consists of isolated nodes
only, then Σ = 1, whereas Σ = 0 for systems with a sin-
gle connected component. For a network consisting of M
connected components of same size and density of inter-
actions Σ = 1− 1/M : The larger the number of compo-
nents, the larger the social segregation. The segregation
of the social bulk is Σ = 0.476, significantly stronger than
random expectation 〈Σrand〉 = 0.172 (p-value < 10−5)
based on a configuration model preserving the connectiv-
6ity distribution. This indicates that strong interactions
lead to more segregated components, with fewer bridges
among connected components than expected from the
heterogeneity of interactions only. Hence, the observed
segregation represents additional evidence for the pres-
ence of antagonism in the considered social ecosystem.
Polarization, fragmentation and segregation analyses
all constitute evidence that the social bulk displays
densely connected groups in opposition with each other.
Groups in the social bulk highlight digital
augmentation
Through the multilevel approach, we identified 8 main
opposing communities (i.e. having more than 2% of the
total nodes in the network), as reported in Tab. I. The
analysis of hubs in each group of the social bulk indicates
that i) one group corresponds to a single augmented hu-
man and his/her bots; ii) five groups directly map the
ecosystems of the main Italian political parties; iii) two
groups encode news media universe, either traditional or
online news organisations.
In this context, we provide an operative definition of
augmented humans as human users having at least 50% of
bot neighbours in the social bulk. Users with less than 3
bulk interactions are discarded. We systematically iden-
tified 1,010 user accounts (12.7% of humans in the social
bulk) corresponding to augmented humans. The most
central augmented human in terms of number of social
interactions is User01 which interacts with 2,700 bots and
55 humans in the social bulk. We have anonymized the
username for privacy purposes.
It is natural to wonder about how bots, humans
and augmented humans are organized into communities
within the social bulk. In fact, given the relevance of
the voting event in the real world, our hypothesis is that
communities should reflect real political movements and
groups, to some extent.
First, we focused our attention on the augmented hu-
man’s group, consisting of more than 2,500 automated
agents artificially interacting with the augmented human
user. This peculiar activity leads to a star-like structure
for the corresponding community, as shown in Fig, 4.
This finding has triggered our attention, driving our ef-
forts towards quantifying the infiltration Is of a specific
class s of accounts in each group, by considering the cor-
responding fraction of users in a given group (see Meth-
ods). Table II reports the infiltration of augmented hu-
mans in the groups of the social bulk. Unsurprisingly, in-
filtration of bots is higher in the group representing the
augmented human and his/her automatic entourage of
interacting social bots. Furthermore, we find that groups
relative to news media are richer in bots compared to
groups representing political parties, which is compati-
ble with our previous finding of bots being preferentially
news media broadcaster in the observed data.
The infiltration of augmented humans is approximately
uniformly distributed across all identified groups, with
the remarkable exception of C8, the augmented human’s
community. One would expect for the groups richer in
bots to have also more augmented humans. Instead, bot
and augmented human infiltration do not correlate with
each other (Kendall Tau 0.07, p-value 0.8), indicating
that augmented humans tend to interact selectively with
the bots available in their groups rather than creating
more. This trend is not valid for the group C8, where one
human (User01) interacts almost exclusively with bots.
Augmented humans are hidden influencers
All the augmented humans identified in this study
have, on average, less than 9,000 followers and 1,500
friends, indicating that a considerable amount of social
influence was obtained by users that preferentially inter-
acted with bots during the considered event. The analy-
sis of information cascades revealed that almost 2 out 3
augmented humans played an important role in the flow
of online content: 67% of this class of users were either in-
fluentials or hidden influentials or broadcasters. Hidden
influentials, known to be efficient spreaders in viral phe-
nomena [41], are mostly humans but augmented humans
also falls in this category (e.g. User01).
Groups in the social bulk reflect electoral outcomes
In order to investigate the representativeness of on-
line groups in terms of real-world events beyond the
hub analysis, we focused on the structural features of
groups, namely the interaction volume of a group (i.e.
the number of strong social interactions among users in
the group) and the group size (i.e. the number of users
in a given group). In Tab. II, we show that the outcome
of Italian elections (i.e. the fraction of votes received by
each political group) strongly correlates with the group
volume (Spearman rank correlation coefficient ρ = 0.9,
p-value = 0.039). This correlation is statistically signif-
icant within a 5% significance level and direct sampling
of rankings was used in order to compute the p-value
without relying on any assumption about the large-scale
statistical properties of the data. The strong correlation
found indicates that the volume of online interactions
closely mirrors the election outcome.
DISCUSSION
Online social systems and the information they contin-
uously generate provide an invaluable resource for com-
putational social scientists and their large-scale analysis
of human behavior [32, 42, 43] and the emergence of col-
lective attention [2, 44]. The analysis of information and
behavioral spreading on social media [17] revealed that
an individual is much more likely to adopt a content when
7FIG. 4. Social bulk of Italian elections. a) Twitter users can retweet or mention or reply with each other. Each action
encode a specific social meaning and, by considering the co-existence of endorsement (i.e. retweet) and discussion (i.e. mention
or reply), between the same pairs of users, we filter out spurious interactions to identify the social bulk of the system. b)
Visualization of the social bulk emerged during Italian elections, with users (i.e., the nodes) colored by the community they
belong to (see the text for further detail). c) The eight communities with at least 2% of users are represented separately, while
preserving their relative position in the social bulk shown in panel b). Note the remarkable star-like topology characterizing
the augmented human identified in the system.
his/her neighbors in the social network tend to reinforce
it [45]. On the one hand, this allows online media to
facilitate, for instance, the dissemination of emergency
information and help coordinate relief efforts [46]. On
the other hand, the same social networks can be misused
to spread fake content farther, faster and deeper [13].
In this work we have identified and quantified a new
phenomenon, i.e. digital augmentation, to characterize
individuals that coordinate from hundreds to thousands
of social bots for achieving a social influence comparable
to the one of political parties and news media organisa-
tions, with serious repercussions in the real-world.
Our results strongly support the idea that via augmen-
tation even common users can become social influencers
without having a large social neighborhood but rather
by recurring to the aid of either armies of bots or the
selection of a few key helping bots. This digital aug-
mentation represents an interesting behavioral response
aimed at overcoming the well documented pressure for
achieving influence and recognition in online ecosystems
8Bulk Group Top Influencers Social Ecosystem
Bot
infiltration
Augmented
infiltration
C1
fattoquotidiano, User02, Mov5Stelle, MovPopulistaIta,
M5S Europa, Puglia M5S, ManlioDS, MovPopulistaIta
M5S 13.4% 13.3%
C2
repubblica, Agenzia Ansa, sole24ore, TgLa7, RaiNews,
Viminale, RTL1025, Corriere, MediasetTgcom24
Media 24.5% 12.1%
C3
SkyTG24, you trend, nonleggerlo, ilpost,
claudioporcu73, User03, agorarai, espressoline
Web Media 26.6% 15%
C4
matteorenzi, pdnetwork, CarloCalenda, EugenioCardi,
danielevpd, PaoloGentiloni, PdMilano
PD 15.5% 15.4%
C5
liberi uguali, civati, PietroGrasso, lauraboldrini,
LiberiEugualiIT, SI sinistra
LEU 16.3% 19.1%
C6
berlusconi, forza italia, Elezioni2018 FI,
renatobrunetta, MennaFini, GruppoFICamera
FI 28.2% 22.1%
C7
RiscattoNaz, mattosalvinimi, borghi claudio, AlbertoBagnai,
GiorgiaMeloni, FratellidItalia, LegaSalvini
Lega and FdI 9.5% 12.9%
C8 User01 Augmented Human 97.9% 3 · 10−4 %
TABLE I. Largest online social groups. Most populated communities (with more than 250 users) in the social bulk, with
top influencers listed per group. Top influencers are identified as hubs in the bulk network. As evident from the similarities
among top influencers, groups reflect specific ecosystems of the Italian voting event: “Movimento 5 Stelle” (M5S), traditional
media (Media), media with massive online presence (Web Media), “Partito Democratico” (PD), “Liberi e Uguali” (LEU),
“Forza Italia” (FI), “Lega” and “Fratelli d’Italia” (Lega and FdI), and then the augmented human with all his/her interacting
bots (Augmented Human). Bot (augmented) infiltration indicates the percentage of bot users (augmented humans) in each
group. Excluding the community corresponding to the augmented human (made for 97.9% of bots), the mean bot infiltration
in the bulk network is 29.2% while the mean augmented infiltration is 15.7%. The media groups are richer in bots as expected,
since they include news media and online accounts of news papers.
[4, 6, 16, 27] and during voting events [19]. While in real
life such augmentation comes mainly from smart devices,
our work presents compelling evidence that in online so-
cial platforms the augmentation for achieving social in-
fluence is represented by an exploitation of social bots by
human accounts.
Furthermore, the strong correlation between the vol-
ume of online interactions in the social bulks and the
electoral outcomes highlights the role potentially played
by online social systems during the voting process. This
finding is in full agreement with previous works show-
ing how online ecosystems acted upon society by altering
the emotions [19] and beliefs [3, 4] of large populations
of individuals. It is worth underlining that the observed
groups are relative to the network structure of social en-
dorsements: Considering the layout of online endorse-
ment can provide information beneficial for more accu-
rate predictions of electoral outcomes. Further investi-
gation of online social systems under the perspective of
predicting electoral outcomes would provide interesting
challenges for future work.
Our work provides a first step towards a more system-
atic quantification of the impact of digital augmentation
in opinion formation and the manipulation of online at-
tention by means of human-bot interactions.
METHODS
Data collection. Between 24 February 2018 and 7
March 2018, we have collected 966,483 messages (tweets)
posted by 194,273 different users to the microblogging
platform Twitter, containing at least one of the fol-
lowing keywords or hashtags: “elezioni”, “#elezioni”,
“#elezioni2018”, “#elezioni4marzo”, “#ItalyElec-
tion2018”, “#voto”, “#4marzo”, “#M5S”, “#PD”,
“#LeU”, “#LiberieUguali”, “#ForzaItalia”, “#FDI”,
“#FI”, “#lega”, “#FratellidItalia”, “#MDP”.
Tweets have been collected using the streaming real-
time provided by Twitter API platform, filtered by the
above keywords. Twitter by default limits to 1% of
the overall number of Tweets per second the fraction of
tweets that can be retrieved from the streaming API.
However, when the fraction of tweets concerning specific
keywords is smaller than 1% of the global volume, Twit-
ter does not apply limitations and the complete flow of
information is collected. When this is not the case, Twit-
ter provides messages of warning, reporting the cumula-
tive number of missed tweets.
In the case of Italian elections, we received no warn-
ings, therefore we have collected 100% of tweets contain-
ing the specified keywords.
Classification task. In this work the classification of
users in our data set as “humans” or “bots” is based on
features providing the best classification accuracy accord-
ing to recent studies [11]: 1) Statuses count ; 2) Followers
count ; 3) Friends count ; 4) Favourites count ; 5) Listed
9Group Election Outcome (% votes) Rank Interaction Volume Rank Group Size Rank
M5S 32.68% 1 3,857 (34.82%) 1 1,162 2
Lega and FdI 20.76% 2 3,205 (28.93%) 2 1,491 1
PD 18.72% 3 2,504 (22,60%) 3 1,133 3
FI 14.01% 4 675 (6.09%) 5 330 5
LEU 3.39% 5 837 (7.55%) 4 434 4
TABLE II. Network analysis of groups in the social bulk reflect election outcomes. The five political ecosystems
from the bulk network are ranked against their topological features: i) interaction volume, i.e. the number of social actions
within the group; ii) size, i.e. the number of individuals in the group. The rank based on online interactions strongly mirrors
the election outcome (Spearman ρ = 0.9, p-value = 0.039), supporting the hypothesis that online social interactions are tightly
entwined to outcomes and events in the real-world.
data set bot human total
cresci2015 0 5301 5301
cresci2017 7543 3474 11017
cyborgs 2756 0 2756
aboutme 0 2463 2463
omnibots 3530 0 3530
russian-trolls 389 0 389
TOTAL 14218 8775 22993
TABLE III. Proportions of bot and human users in the
training data.
count ; 6) Default profile; 7) Geo enabled ; 8) Profile use
background image; 9) Protected ; 10) Verified for a total
of ten features (Nfeats = 10).
Searching for better performance we tested different
machine learning techniques on an independent dataset
created ad-hoc (see Supplementary Information) from a
collection of manually annotated datasets (see Tab III).
Models are trained on the 80% of the data and validated
over the remaining 20%. The subdivision between the
two sets was carried respecting the balancing between
bots and humans present at the level of the single orig-
inal datasets, in this way we have all type of different
bots both in training and validation. The models based
on random forest and deep neural network provided us
with the highest accuracy (> 90%) and precision in iden-
tifying bots (> 95%). We chose the deep neural network
model because it also provided a more stable classifica-
tion of certain users playing the role of broadcasters (see
Supplementary Information).
Fiedler partitioning, modularity, segregation and
infiltration. Fiedler partitioning is a widely used tech-
nique from spectral graph theory for solving the min-max
cut problem, i.e. partitioning a network in two compo-
nents of similar size but connected by links whose total
weights are the smallest possible [33]. Fiedler partition-
ing is obtained by considering the eigenvalue problem:
(D −W )q = λq, (1)
for a connected network represented by the weighted
adjacency matrix W , with wij equal to the weight of the
link between nodes i and j, and by a matrix D having
the strength of nodes on its main diagonal. The spectral
partitioning is obtained by identifying nodes relative to
positive and negative entries in the second eigenvector q2
relative to the second eigenvalue λ2. q2 and λ2 are also
called Fiedler vector and Fiedler value, respectively.
We use modularity [34] for identifying the polarization
of users in the social bulk in two groups, labelled here by
c1 and c2:
ΦF =
1
2m
∑
ij
[
Aij − sisj
2s
]
δci,cj . (2)
Here, Aij is 0 is users i and j did not interact, otherwise
it is equal to the number of their interactions; si indicates
the total number of interactions involving the i-th user,
i.e. its strength, while s is the total number of interac-
tions in the network. Polarization values ΦF close to 0
indicate no antagonism between opposing factions, while
ΦF close to 1 is relative to strongly opposing factions.
We use the generalization of modularity to more than
two groups for establishing the fragmentation of users in
antagonizing social groups. The mathematical definition
is similar to Eq. (2), except for the fact that we consider
more possible partitioning into a number communities
(c1, c2, ..., cM ) larger than 2. The number M of existing
communities is not known a priori and an optimization
process must be employed to discover best partitioning
of the system.
We measure social segregation by considering the aver-
age size of connected components weighted by the num-
ber of their links. Indicating with C the set of connected
components and with Ci the set of ni nodes connected
by ei edges in the i-th connected component, we define
social segregation as:
Σ = 1−
|C|∑
i=1
niei
|C|∑
i=1
ni ×
|C|∑
i=1
ei
. (3)
Σ ranges between 0 (a network with a single connected
component) and 1 (a network of isolated nodes with no
links).
We define infiltration of a given type of users in a given
social group i as the fraction of users of that type in group
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i, namely:
Is =
Mi∑
i=1
si
ui
(4)
where M is the number of groups, si is the number of
accounts of class s in the i-th group and ui is the number
of users in that group.
Testing the role of news media. In the analysis
of the social bulk we identified two communities corre-
sponding to news media accounts. In order to test for
the influence of these information hubs on human-bot in-
teractions, we performed a test in which we checked the
robustness of our results when all users in the above two
communities identifying news media accounts were not
considered. The removal of news media accounts led to
negligible fluctuations (around 0.02) in the fractions of
human-bot interactions (cfr. Fig. 1 (a)) and in the total
volume of tweets produced by bots (around 0.4%). These
results indicate that a prominent amount of human-bot
interactions does not involve news media accounts and it
is not influenced by the presence of information hubs.
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